TPM Review – ATS Editorials

  • Home 2020 TPM Review – ATS Editori....

TPM Review – ATS Editorials

59TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, Singapore, 30 March – 3 April 2020

WP No. 83

TPM Review – ATS Editorials

Presented by TOC

 

IMPORTANT NOTE: The IFATCA Annual Conference 2020 in Singapore was cancelled. The present working paper was never discussed at Conference by the committee(s). Resolutions presented by this working paper (if any) were never voted.

Summary

The ATS section of the Technical Professional Manual is robust in policies and some of them need update. This paper details the editorial changes that are proposed.

Introduction

1.1  Within the ATS section of the Technical Professional Manual (TPM) there are documents that date back 30 years, some of which are in need of minor edits to current documents whereas others need major overhaul.

1.2  There is also a need for continuity throughout the whole of the TPM including harmonization of word usage.

1.3  This paper details only the editorials that are needed within the ATS section of the TPM.

1.4  Any existing TPM policy within the Technical sections which is proposed for movement to the Terms and Acronyms section should be clearly marked as an IFATCA specific definition.

Discussion

2.1  Within the TPM there are many policies of which some date back to nearing its inception. Due to changes in technology and application among other matters there is a need for a book wide update.

2.1.1  Within the document there are a few edits that amount to minor word changes to work toward harmonization with ICAO documents.

2.1.2  Some of the existing policies also feature definitions that are not within in the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM and should be placed there. These definitions should be clearly demarcated so the user knows this is an IFATCA specific definition. Also, there should be a hyperlink featured within the policy leading to the definition itself. Also in cases where the Acronyms and Terms section has a specific definition the paper which lead to the originating document for it will be linked back.

2.1.3  There are a few policies which are currently within the TPM that do not propose any specific action or requirement but rather just state the definition. These policies are proposed for movement as well as the information is still useful and valid but may not be a policy unto its own.

2.2 Existing IFATCA policy, ATS3.3, regarding Harmonization of Airspace Classification reads:

MA’s shall urge ATS Authorities to co-ordinate and harmonise with all neighbouring states their national airspace classification, in accordance with ICAO Annex 11 Appendix 4, to permit safe and efficient operating conditions to all airspace users and air traffic controllers. Airspace classification should be appropriate for the traffic operating in the airspace, to avoid over and under classification. As traffic situations change, the classification may have to change accordingly. Local operational controllers should be involved in the airspace classification process.

 

2.2.1 Within the opening of the policy the phrase, “MA’s shall urge ATS Authorities,” is utilized; but the MA would likely not be the one doing the urging. Since this role would likely fall to the ANSP the proposed revision is ‘MA’s shall urge ANSPs.”

2.3 There is the need for a small amendment within Standardisation of Regional Transition Altitudes within IFATCA TPM ATS3.4:

Standardisation of Transition Altitudes on a region wide basis be implemented where applicable.

 

2.3.1 This policy is in need of a minor edit of the inclusion of shall prior to the words be implemented to correct the phrase to viable English.

2.4 There is a need to move the content located within ATS 3.7 Sector Capacity Values. ATS 3.7 reads as follows:

IFATCA defines:

Sector Capacity:

The maximum number of flights that may enter a sector per hour averaged over a sustained period of time, to ensure a safe, orderly and efficient traffic flow.

Occupancy Counts:

The number of flights occupying a sector simultaneously during a specified period of time.

 

2.4.1 This policy goes so far as to state “defines” in reference to the 2 definitions. Therefore, it is suggested to place these definitions within the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM.

2.5 Existing IFATCA policy regarding the Impact of Technology on Air Traffic Control within ICAO Assigned International Airspace, ATS 3.8, states:

The current ICAO assignment of international airspace within ICAO ‘NOT’ be modified / changed based solely on the development / implementation of technology by one or more States, unless agreed to by all MAs concerned.

 

2.5.1 This paragraph is in need of a few minor grammatic editorials. The first line is missing the word shall prior to not, it should be adapted to shall not. Additionally the capitalization of the word NOT should be remedied to a lower case for consistency. For further clarity the simple / marks should be altered to say and/or. The complete revised sentence would read,

“The current ICAO assignment of international airspace within ICAO shall not be modified and/or changed based solely on the development and/or implementation of technology by one or more States, unless agreed to by all MAs concerned.”

2.6 IFATCA TPM policy, ATS 3.9, regarding Radar Monitoring states:

Route spacing standards should not be reduced below those that would otherwise be required purely because of the use of radar monitoring.

Radar monitoring should not be used as the means of providing separation with obstacles (terrain clearance) where aircraft are on their own navigation and below the Minimum Radar Vector Altitude (MRVA). Any escape procedure shall provide adequate terrain clearance from the point the aircraft is below the MRVA to the lowest defined altitude at which any such procedure can be initiated. States are required to assure this.

Any introduction of Performance Based Navigation PBN routes that are closely spaced should be subjected to safety analysis. Such a safety analysis may result in hazards being identified that require automated monitoring assistance for the controller to adequately mitigate the hazard.

Any introduction of closely spaced routes should ensure that controllers can, upon identification or notification of a deviation, carry out the necessary action so that the required separation minimum is not likely to be infringed.

 

2.6.1  Within the policy there is one sentence that needs an edit for harmonization with the rest of the manual. “Any introduction of Performance Based Navigation PBN routes that are closely spaced should be subjected to safety analysis.” The abbreviation of PBN should be housed between parenthesis, such as (PBN). The revised sentence would read,

“Any introduction of Performance Based Navigation (PBN) routes that are closely spaced should be subjected to safety analysis.”

2.6.2  This policy is need of updating and edits beyond the scope of this paper and it is therefore suggested that it be added to the upcoming TOC working program.

2.7 Current IFATCA TPM policy regarding Mixed Mode Operations, ATS 3.13, is as follows:

Mixed mode operations are defined as ATM Operations that require different procedures due to variances in airspace users’ characteristics and/or ATM design within the same area of controller responsibility.

Efforts should be undertaken to reduce existing Mixed Mode Operations by creating intrinsically safe solutions.

Introductions of new Mixed Mode Operations should be avoided by creating intrinsically safe solutions.

When safety of a Mixed Mode Operation cannot be completely managed at an intrinsic level, assessment must take place that the change in the ATM system does not increase controller workload to an unacceptable level.

 

2.7.1  The first sentence, “Mixed mode operations are defined as ATM Operations that require different procedures due to variances in airspace users’ characteristics and/or ATM design within the same area of controller responsibility,” reads more as a definition than policy and should be moved to the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM. This is also beneficial since such a definition is not already included.

2.7.2  There is a small editorial that needs to be made within the final sentence of the policy, “must take place that the change in the ATM system does not increase controller workload to an unacceptable level,” should be reworded to read,

“shall take place to ensure that the change in the ATM system does not increase controller workload to an unacceptable level.”

The replacement of the word must with shall is to continue harmonization with ICAO literature.

2.8 Existing IFATCA policy regarding Virtual Centers and Functional Airspace Blocks, ATS 3.14, states:

ATM data must be of sufficient quality, reliability and integrity for its intended use.

Organisations that provide ATM services beyond state borders shall clearly define the operational legal implications of providing these services, and train controllers in the implications.

The efficient creation and management of an FAB does not necessarily require the physical concentration of all ANS functions within a single centre.

Consideration shall be given to the personal and social implications for controllers associated with the relocation and/or consolidation of ATS units.

Consolidation of ATS units, whether virtual or physical, shall be considered equal to the implementation of a new ATM system.

 

2.8.1  This section is in need of several editorial changes. The title of the policy, “Virtual Centers and Functional Airspace Blocks,” uses the Americanized spelling of centre, which should be corrected for uniformity.

2.8.2  In the first sentence, “ATM data must be of sufficient quality, reliability and integrity for its intended use,” within the sentence there is the need to replace the word must with the word shall to maintain continuity within the TPM and conformity with ICAO.

2.8.3  Within the second sentence, “Organisations that provide ATM services beyond state borders shall clearly define the operational legal implications of providing these services, and train controllers in the implications,” there is an omission of the word “and” between operational and legal.

2.8.4 In the third sentence, “The efficient creation and management of an FAB does not necessarily require the physical concentration of all ANS functions within a single centre,” where “an” is utilized in front of FAB it needs to be altered to “a”.

2.9 The Use of Safety Nets in ATM policy, ATS 3.17, within the IFATCA TPM states:

IFATCA policy is:

A safety net is an airborne and / or ground based function, the sole purpose of which is to alert the pilot or controller of the imminence of collision of aircraft, aircraft and terrain / obstacles, as well as penetration of dangerous airspace.

IFATCA policy is:

When implementing ground-based safety nets, common phraseology and procedures shall be used in their operation.

 

2.9.1 The first part of the policy, “A safety net is an airborne and / or ground based function, the sole purpose of which is to alert the pilot or controller of the imminence of collision of aircraft, aircraft and terrain / obstacles, as well as penetration of dangerous airspace,” reads as more of a definition than policy and would fit better within the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM.

2.10 Existing IFATCA TPM Policy ATS 3.18 referencing Controller Tools is as follows:

Controller Tools (CTs) are functions of an ATM system that enhance a controller’s ability to meet the objectives of ATS. They provide information that assists controllers in the planning and execution of their duties, rather than dictating a course of action.

 

2.10.1 The current policy amounts to more of a definition than a standalone policy and therefore should be moved to the Acronym and Terms section of the TPM.

2.11 Current IFATCA policy ATS 3.19 regarding Conflict Detection Tools states:

Conflict Detection Tools (CDTs) are computer-based Controller Tools that identify conflicts and then provide system generated conflict advice to controllers.

CDTs can provide conformance monitoring to ensure that aircraft comply with instructions issued to resolve a detected conflict.

Responsibility and legal implications should be fully addressed before implementation of CDTs.

During degraded modes, clearly defined operational procedures must exist. Nuisance and false alerts must be kept to an absolute minimum.

 

2.11.1 The first 2 sentences read as more of a definition than policy and should be moved to the Acronym and Terms section of the TPM.

2.11.2 Within the final section of the policy, “During degraded modes, clearly defined operational procedures must exist,” the word must needs to be replaced by shall to continue conformity with ICAO documents.

2.12 Existing IFATCA policy on Area Proximity Warnings, ATS 3.21, is as follows:

An Area Proximity Warning (APW) is an alert provided to a controller of the imminent incursion of a flight into “special-use” airspace.

Note – The response to such a warning will be dictated by the nature of the airspace in question and its specific requirements.

 

2.12.1 This current policy is more of a definition than a policy and would better be relocated to the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM.

2.13 Existing IFTAC policy within the TPM regarding Route Conformance Monitoring Systems (RCMS), ATS 3.22, is as follows:

Definitions:

A ROUTE CONFORMANCE MONITORING SYSTEM (RCMS) is a function of an Automated ATS System that monitors the position of an aircraft to detect when it deviates from its route. An RCMS is considered to be a Controller Tool.

A ROUTE DEVIATION ALERT (RDA) is an alert provided to a controller to notify that an aircraft’s position is displaced outside the tolerances defined within RCMS.

Note: Certain processing may be suspended.

An ESTIMATED TIME OVER DEVIATION ALERT (ETODA) is an alert provided to a controller to notify a controller that a new estimate is outside specified parameters when compared to a previous estimate.

 

2.13.1 This existing policy goes so far as to list itself as definitions; as such this policy is better suited to the definitions being moved to the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM.

2.14 Current IFATCA Policy 3.30 regarding Air Traffic Flow Management states:

IFATCA encourages the implementation of ATFM processes provided that:

  • The process achieves an optimum overall performance.
  • Air Traffic Controllers and Flow Management Controllers are involved in the design of their local procedures and the determination of capacity values and / or occupancy values.
  • The communication between and the compatibility of regional systems is established.
  • The tactical capacity is managed on an operational level.
  • The process, including restrictions, is transparent to all users.
  • Procedures should be in place to allow controllers to report occasions where they felt overloaded or sector capacity values were exceeded. Feedback should be given to the reporting controller.

 

2.14.1 One minor edit is required to keep consistency in grammar throughout the policy of changing “Procedures should be in place” to “Procedures are in place.”

2.15 The IFATCA TPM existing policy regarding Merging and Sequencing Concepts, ATS 3.33 currently reads:

IFATCA encourages the development of sequencing and merging tools provided that:

  • They provide controllers with reliable and effective information.
  • Local airspace structure, complexity and traffic density are taken into account.
  • Integration with other systems and adjacent units is possible.

 

2.15.1 The bulk of the policy remains strong and valid with the need of a small alteration. The need for the system capability may not be present in all cases but can be crucial in some scenarios. Therefore, the final bullet point needs to be amended to read:

  • Integration with other systems and adjacent units if required.

2.16 The IFATCA TPM section ATS 3.38 regarding En-Route Restrictions reads:

Responsibility for terrain and obstruction clearance must be clearly defined and always must lie either with the air crew or ATC. There must never be a situation where doubt exists about who is responsible for this task.

ICAO documentation should provide clear and unambiguous language with regard to responsibility for terrain avoidance, including amendment to the Objectives of air traffic services to include the prevention of collisions between aircraft and terrain.

ATCOs should be provided with ATS surveillance tools and/or procedures to efficiently separate aircraft from terrain and obstacles.

 

2.16.1 There is the need to change must to shall throughout the policy for continued harmonization with ICAO documents.

2.16.2 Within the first paragraph it is proposed to further change “air crew” to “crew”.

2.17 Current IFATCA TPM Policy ATS 3.43, regarding Crisis Management, states:

Air traffic controllers should be involved in the development of contingency and crisis management plans. This includes regional and sub-regional contingency plans. IFATCA supports the OCIR model for the development of such procedures. Contingency plans should be regularly updated.

 

2.17.1  The current policy utilizes the phrase OCIR without it being defined either within the phrase or within the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM.

2.17.2  It is proposed to add an IFATCA specific definition including a graphical definition of OCIR to the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM. The proposed definition would be seen as:

The OCIR-model is a practical method for ATC crisis management. It describes four steps in incident stabilization and control. As the primary reaction to any disruption is directed inwards in the organization to regain control, the OCIR model suggests a broader focus by communicating, consulting and cooperating with external parties in all phases of crisis response.

2.18 Existing IFATCA TPM Policy regarding Moving to a New Facility, ATS 3.44, reads:

Operational controllers shall be involved in the design, development and deployment when moving ATS facilities.

Their role shall include at a minimum:

a) Define facility requirements and user needs.

b) Participating in the risk and safety assessment processes

c) Defining operational training requirements prior to the transition.

d) Validating the new facility.

e) Providing feedback in the further development of the facility.

 

2.18.1  Within the first point of the list, “ a) Define facility requirements and user needs,” should say defining in lieu of define since it is the controllers that will be doing the work.

2.18.2  For continuity within the list item b) should have a period at the end.

2.18.3  An overall recommendation for the definitions moved to the Terms and Acronyms and feature the date of the addition and conference. These would then be voted on for amendment in the future.

Conclusions

3.1. There are many policies in need of review which ranges from minor edits to being placed in a totally different section of the TPM.

Recommendations

4.1.  It is recommended that ATS 3.3, existing policy regarding Harmonisation of the Airspace Classification:

MA’s shall urge ATS Authorities to co-ordinate and harmonise with all neighbouring states their national airspace classification, in accordance with ICAO Annex 11 Appendix 4, to permit safe and efficient operating conditions to all airspace users and air traffic controllers. Airspace classification should be appropriate for the traffic operating in the airspace, to avoid over and under classification. As traffic situations change, the classification may have to change accordingly. Local operational controllers should be involved in the airspace classification process.

is amended to read:

MA’s shall urge ANSPs to co-ordinate and harmonise with all neighbouring states their national airspace classification, in accordance with ICAO Annex 11 Appendix 4, to permit safe and efficient operating conditions to all airspace users and air traffic controllers. Airspace classification should be appropriate for the traffic operating in the airspace, to avoid over and under classification. As traffic situations change, the classification may have to change accordingly. Local operational controllers should be involved in the airspace classification process.

And is included in the TPM.

4.2.  It is recommended that ATS 3.4, existing policy regarding Standarisation of Regional Transitional Altitudes:

Standardisation of Transition Altitudes on a region wide basis be implemented where applicable.

is amended to read:

Standardisation of Transition Altitudes on a region wide basis shall be implemented where applicable.

And is included in the TPM.

4.3.  It is recommended that ATS 3.8, existing policy regarding ATC within ICAO Assigned International Airspace:

The current ICAO assignment of international airspace within ICAO ‘NOT’ be modified / changed based solely on the development / implementation of technology by one or more States, unless agreed to by all MAs concerned.

is amended to read:

The current ICAO assignment of international airspace within ICAO shall not be modified and / or changed based solely on the development and / or implementation of technology by one or more States, unless agreed to by all MAs concerned.

And is included in the TPM.

4.4.  It is recommended that ATS 3.7, existing policy regarding Sector Capacity Values:

IFATCA defines:

Sector Capacity:

The maximum number of flights that may enter a sector per hour averaged over a sustained period of time, to ensure a safe, orderly and efficient traffic flow.

Occupancy Counts:

The number of flights occupying a sector simultaneously during a specified period of time.

is moved to the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM.

4.5.  It is recommended that ATS 3.9, existing policy regarding Radar Monitoring:

Route spacing standards should not be reduced below those that would otherwise be required purely because of the use of radar monitoring.

Radar monitoring should not be used as the means of providing separation with obstacles (terrain clearance) where aircraft are on their own navigation and below the Minimum Radar Vector Altitude (MRVA). Any escape procedure shall provide adequate terrain clearance from the point the aircraft is below the MRVA to the lowest defined altitude at which any such procedure can be initiated. States are required to assure this.

Any introduction of Performance Based Navigation PBN routes that are closely spaced should be subjected to safety analysis. Such a safety analysis may result in hazards being identified that require automated monitoring assistance for the controller to adequately mitigate the hazard.

Any introduction of closely spaced routes should ensure that controllers can, upon identification or notification of a deviation, carry out the necessary action so that the required separation minimum is not likely to be infringed.

is amended to read:

Route spacing standards should not be reduced below those that would otherwise be required purely because of the use of radar monitoring.

Radar monitoring should not be used as the means of providing separation with obstacles (terrain clearance) where aircraft are on their own navigation and below the Minimum Radar Vector Altitude (MRVA). Any escape procedure shall provide adequate terrain clearance from the point the aircraft is below the MRVA to the lowest defined altitude at which any such procedure can be initiated. States are required to assure this.

Any introduction of Performance Based Navigation (PBN) routes that are closely spaced should be subjected to safety analysis. Such a safety analysis may result in hazards being identified that require automated monitoring assistance for the controller to adequately mitigate the hazard.

Any introduction of closely spaced routes should ensure that controllers can, upon identification or notification of a deviation, carry out the necessary action so that the required separation minimum is not likely to be infringed.

And is included in the TPM.

4.6.  It is recommended that the review of ATS 3.9, existing policy regarding Radar Monitoring:

Route spacing standards should not be reduced below those that would otherwise be required purely because of the use of radar monitoring.

Radar monitoring should not be used as the means of providing separation with obstacles (terrain clearance) where aircraft are on their own navigation and below the Minimum Radar Vector Altitude (MRVA). Any escape procedure shall provide adequate terrain clearance from the point the aircraft is below the MRVA to the lowest defined altitude at which any such procedure can be initiated. States are required to assure this.

Any introduction of Performance Based Navigation PBN routes that are closely spaced should be subjected to safety analysis. Such a safety analysis may result in hazards being identified that require automated monitoring assistance for the controller to adequately mitigate the hazard.

Any introduction of closely spaced routes should ensure that controllers can, upon identification or notification of a deviation, carry out the necessary action so that the required separation minimum is not likely to be infringed.

Is added to the TOC 2020/2021 Work Program.

4.7.  It is recommended that ATS 3.13, existing policy regarding Mixed Mode Operations:

Mixed mode operations are defined as ATM Operations that require different procedures due to variances in airspace users’ characteristics and/or ATM design within the same area of controller responsibility.

Efforts should be undertaken to reduce existing Mixed Mode Operations by creating intrinsically safe solutions.

Introductions of new Mixed Mode Operations should be avoided by creating intrinsically safe solutions.

When safety of a Mixed Mode Operation cannot be completely managed at an intrinsic level, assessment must take place that the change in the ATM system does not increase controller workload to an unacceptable level.

is amended to read:

Efforts should be undertaken to reduce existing Mixed Mode Operations by creating intrinsically safe solutions.
Introductions of new Mixed Mode Operations should be avoided by creating intrinsically safe solutions.

When safety of a Mixed Mode Operation cannot be completely managed at an intrinsic level, assessment shall take place to ensure that the change in the ATM system does not increase controller workload to an unacceptable level.

And is included in the TPM.

4.8.  It is recommended that from ATS 3.13, existing policy regarding Mixed Mode Operations:

IFATCA encourages the implementation of ATFM processes provided that: Mixed mode operations are defined as ATM Operations that require different procedures due to variances in airspace users’ characteristics and/or ATM design within the same area of controller responsibility.

Efforts should be undertaken to reduce existing Mixed Mode Operations by creating intrinsically safe solutions.

Introductions of new Mixed Mode Operations should be avoided by creating intrinsically safe solutions.

When safety of a Mixed Mode Operation cannot be completely managed at an intrinsic level, assessment must take place that the change in the ATM system does not increase controller workload to an unacceptable level.

The following definition is moved to the Acronyms and Terms section:

Mixed mode operations are defined as ATM Operations that require different procedures due to variances in airspace users’ characteristics and/or ATM design within the same area of controller responsibility.

And is included in the TPM.

4.9.  It is recommended that ATS 3.14, existing policy regarding Virtual Centers and Functional Airspace Blocks:

ATM data must be of sufficient quality, reliability and integrity for its intended use.

Organisations that provide ATM services beyond state borders shall clearly define the operational legal implications of providing these services, and train controllers in the implications.

The efficient creation and management of an FAB does not necessarily require the physical concentration of all ANS functions within a single centre.

Consideration shall be given to the personal and social implications for controllers associated with the relocation and/or consolidation of ATS units.

Consolidation of ATS units, whether virtual or physical, shall be considered equal to the implementation of a new ATM system.

is amended to read:

ATM data shall be of sufficient quality, reliability and integrity for its intended use.

Organisations that provide ATM services beyond state borders shall clearly define the operational and legal implications of providing these services, and train controllers in the implications.

The efficient creation and management of a FAB does not necessarily require the physical concentration of all ANS functions within a single centre. Consideration shall be given to the personal and social implications for controllers associated with the relocation and/or consolidation of ATS units. Consolidation of ATS units, whether virtual or physical, shall be considered equal to the implementation of a new ATM system.

And is included in the TPM.

4.10.  It is recommended that from ATS 3.17, existing policy regarding Use of Safety Nets in ATM:

IFATCA policy is:

A safety net is an airborne and / or ground based function, the sole purpose of which is to alert the pilot or controller of the imminence of collision of aircraft, aircraft and terrain / obstacles, as well as penetration of dangerous airspace.

IFATCA policy is:

When implementing ground-based safety nets, common phraseology and procedures shall be used in their operation.

The following definition is moved to the Acronyms and Terms section:

A safety net is an airborne and / or ground based function, the sole purpose of which is to alert the pilot or controller of the imminence of collision of aircraft, aircraft and terrain / obstacles, as well as penetration of dangerous airspace.

And is included in the TPM.

4.11.  It is recommended that from ATS 3.17, existing policy regarding Use of Safety Nets in ATM:

IFATCA policy is:

A safety net is an airborne and / or ground based function, the sole purpose of which is to alert the pilot or controller of the imminence of collision of aircraft, aircraft and terrain / obstacles, as well as penetration of dangerous airspace.

IFATCA policy is:

When implementing ground-based safety nets, common phraseology and procedures shall be used in their operation.

is amended to read:

When implementing ground-based safety nets, common phraseology and procedures shall be used in their operation.

And is included in the TPM.

4.12.  It is recommended that ATS 3.18, existing policy regarding Controller Tools:

Controller Tools (CTs) are functions of an ATM system that enhance a controller’s ability to meet the objectives of ATS. They provide information that assists controllers in the planning and execution of their duties, rather than dictating a course of action.

Is moved to the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM.

4.13.  It is recommended that ATS 3.19, existing policy regarding Conflict Detection Tools:

Conflict Detection Tools (CDTs) are computer based Controller Tools that identify conflicts and then provide system generated conflict advice to controllers.

CDTs can provide conformance monitoring to ensure that aircraft comply with instructions issued to resolve a detected conflict.

Responsibility and legal implications should be fully addressed before implementation of CDTs.

During degraded modes, clearly defined operational procedures must exist. Nuisance and false alerts must be kept to an absolute minimum.

is amended to read:

Responsibility and legal implications should be fully addressed before implementation of CDTs.

During degraded modes, clearly defined operational procedures shall exist. Nuisance and false alerts must be kept to an absolute minimum.

And is included in the TPM.

4.14.  It is recommended that from ATS 3.19, existing policy regarding Conflict Detection Tools:

Conflict Detection Tools (CDTs) are computer based Controller Tools that identify conflicts and then provide system generated conflict advice to controllers.

CDTs can provide conformance monitoring to ensure that aircraft comply with instructions issued to resolve a detected conflict.

Responsibility and legal implications should be fully addressed before implementation of CDTs.

During degraded modes, clearly defined operational procedures must exist. Nuisance and false alerts must be kept to an absolute minimum.

The following portion thereof is moved to Acronyms and Terms section:

Conflict Detection Tools (CDTs) are computer-based Controller Tools that identify conflicts and then provide system generated conflict advice to controllers.

CDTs can provide conformance monitoring to ensure that aircraft comply with instructions issued to resolve a detected conflict.

4.15.  It is recommended that ATS 3.21, existing policy regarding Area Proximity Warnings:

An Area Proximity Warning (APW) is an alert provided to a controller of the imminent incursion of a flight into “special-use” airspace.

Note – The response to such a warning will be dictated by the nature of the airspace in question and its specific requirements.

is moved to the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM.

4.16.  It is recommended that ATS 3.22, existing policy regarding Route Conformance Monitoring Systems (RCMS):

Definitions:

A ROUTE CONFORMANCE MONITORING SYSTEM (RCMS) is a function of an Automated ATS System that monitors the position of an aircraft to detect when it deviates from its route. An RCMS is considered to be a Controller Tool.

A ROUTE DEVIATION ALERT (RDA) is an alert provided to a controller to notify that an aircraft’s position is displaced outside the tolerances defined within RCMS.

Note: Certain processing may be suspended.

An ESTIMATED TIME OVER DEVIATION ALERT (ETODA) is an alert provided to a controller to notify a controller that a new estimate is outside specified parameters when compared to a previous estimate.

is moved to the Acronyms and Terms section of the TPM.

4.17.  It is recommended that ATS 3.30, existing policy regarding Air Traffic Flow Management- Implementation:

IFATCA encourages the implementation of ATFM processes provided that:

  • The process achieves an optimum overall performance.
  • Air Traffic Controllers and Flow Management Controllers are involved in the design of their local procedures and the determination of capacity values and / or occupancy values.
  • The communication between and the compatibility of regional systems is established.
  • The tactical capacity is managed on an operational level.
  • The process, including restrictions, is transparent to all users.
  • Procedures should be in place to allow controllers to report occasions where they felt overloaded or sector capacity values were exceeded. Feedback should be given to the reporting controller.

is amended to read:

IFATCA encourages the implementation of ATFM processes provided that:

  • The process achieves an optimum overall performance.
  • Air Traffic Controllers and Flow Management Controllers are involved in the design of their local procedures and the determination of capacity values and / or occupancy values.
  • The communication between and the compatibility of regional systems is established.
  • The tactical capacity is managed on an operational level.
  • The process, including restrictions, is transparent to all users.
  • Procedures are in place to allow controllers to report occasions where they felt overloaded or sector capacity values were exceeded. Feedback should be given to the reporting controller.

And is included in the TPM.

4.18.  It is recommended that ATS 3.33, existing policy regarding Merging and Sequencing Concepts:

IFATCA encourages the development of sequencing and merging tools provided that:

  • They provide controllers with reliable and effective information.
  • Local airspace structure, complexity and traffic density are taken into account.
  • Integration with other systems and adjacent units is possible.

is amended to read:

IFATCA encourages the development of sequencing and merging tools provided that:

  • They provide controllers with reliable and effective information.
  • Local airspace structure, complexity and traffic density are taken into account.
  • Integration with other systems and adjacent units if required.

And is included in the TPM.

4.19.  It is recommended that ATS 3.38, existing policy regarding Terrain and Obstacle Clearance Responsibilities:

Responsibility for terrain and obstruction clearance must be clearly defined and always must lie either with the air crew or ATC. There must never be a situation where doubt exists about who is responsible for this task.

ICAO documentation should provide clear and unambiguous language with regard to responsibility for terrain avoidance, including amendment to the Objectives of air traffic services to include the prevention of collisions between aircraft and terrain.

ATCOs should be provided with ATS surveillance tools and/or procedures to efficiently separate aircraft from terrain and obstacles.

is amended to read:

Responsibility for terrain and obstruction clearance shall be clearly defined and always shall lie either with the crew or ATC. There must never be a situation where doubt exists about who is responsible for this task.

ICAO documentation should provide clear and unambiguous language with regard to responsibility for terrain avoidance, including amendment to the Objectives of air traffic services to include the prevention of collisions between aircraft and terrain.

ATCOs should be provided with ATS surveillance tools and/or procedures to efficiently separate aircraft from terrain and obstacles.

And is included in the TPM.

4.20. It is recommended that ATS 3.44, existing policy regarding Moving to a New Facility:

Operational controllers shall be involved in the design, development and deployment when moving ATS facilities.

Their role shall include at a minimum:

a) Define facility requirements and user needs.

b) Participating in the risk and safety assessment processes

c) Defining operational training requirements prior to the transition.

d) Validating the new facility.

e) Providing feedback in the further development of the facility.

is amended to read:

Operational controllers shall be involved in the design, development and deployment when moving ATS facilities.

Their role shall include at a minimum:

a) Defining facility requirements and user needs.

b) Participating in the risk and safety assessment processes.

c) Defining operational training requirements prior to the transition.

d) Validating the new facility.

e) Providing feedback in the further development of the facility.

And included in the TPM.

Last Update: October 2, 2020  

July 19, 2020   81   Jean-Francois Lepage    2020    

Comments are closed.


  • Search Knowledgebase