Review Policy on CPDLC

Review Policy on CPDLC

46TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, Istanbul, Turkey, 16-20 April 2007

WP No. 96

Review Policy on CPDLC

Presented by TOC

Summary

Many evolutions in the data link technologies and implementations required an update of the IFATCA (Controller to Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) policy. Airlines growing use of VHF Data Link Mode 2 (VDL2) has offered a reliable sub network for CPDLC, Future Air Navigations System (FANS-1/A+) has removed the risk “out-of-date” messages and Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) Protected Mode CPDLC has eliminated the risk of “misdelivered” messages. But among other deficiencies to comply with ICAO ATN Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), FANS protocol is still vulnerable to this risk, eventually posing a safety threat in continental high density airspace when voice read-back is removed in a near future. Considering the lack of technical solutions to this FANS misdelivery risk, IFATCA opposes the use of CPDLC with FANS aircraft in continental airspace and requests ATN CPDLC only in high density airspace, and ultimately FANS replacement by ATN data link in oceanic airspace when ICAO ATN SARPs are upgraded.

Introduction

1.1  In the field of data link and Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) a lot of progress has been made in the last years. As the Provisional Policy of the Federation has not been changed since the Annual Conference of 2003 held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the Executive Board (EB) considered it necessary to task the Technical and Operations Committee (TOC) to perform a review of the policies of IFATCA in regards to data link.

1.2  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has decided to halt its CPDLC program that was launched in Miami. The stop of the program was due to increasing structural costs and also to the fact that there was a lack of sufficient data link equipped aircraft. On the other hand, Europe is moving forward with its LINK2000+ programme. A growing number of “pioneer” airlines are equipping their aircraft with VHF Datalink mode 2 (VDL2) and Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) CPDLC capability to communicate with Air Traffic Control (ATC) via datalink. The first LINK2000+ center is Eurocontrol Maastricht Upper Area Control Center (MUAC) in the Netherlands. The DFS (Germany), Skyguide (Switzerland) and ENAV (Italy) are expected to join the programme in 2008. Portugal, France, Spain and the UK are planned to join by 2011. MUAC is using today a Future Air Navigation System (FANS)/ATN dual-stack ground system to accommodate both ATN pioneer aircraft using VDL2 and non-standard FANS-1/A aircraft.

1.3  During the last few years, a lot of changes in the CPDLC field have occurred. Just a few developments:

  • FANS was upgraded to FANS-1/A+, the “plus version” of FANS, with the addition of a timestamp to the message header. This avoids that “out of date” messages are presented to the pilots.
  • ICAO is also in the process of upgrading standard CPDLC (based on ATN SARPS) by mandating Protected Mode CPDLC (PM-CPDLC). This is done by adding an application-level checksum (including the Flight ID) to each CPDLC message. This addition is brought in to eliminate the risk of misdelivery.
  • On the operational side VDL2 has proven to be the most efficient and reliable ATN sub-network for continental high-density CPDLC operations.

1.4 This working paper will provide an update on past, current and future developments of data link and CPDLC-communications, and will review IFATCA Provisional Policy.

Discussion

2.1  CPDLC does enhance safety in situations of blocked frequencies by offering an alternate means of communications to deliver “check stuck microphone” messages to all equipped aircraft and a solution to pass critical clearances to maintain aircraft separation via CPDLC. Besides, CPDLC improves communications capacity by reducing R/T-load, one of the currently most limiting factors for high density continental airspace in Europe and North America. The idea of sharing the communication load between the executive controller and the planner (or coordinator) looks also very promising.

2.2  Two technologies are used nowadays to support CPDLC: FANS-1/A and ATN. In Oceanic airspace, FANS-1/A is the first and only technology available to provide datalink services, but also Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract (ADS-C). In continental airspace, ATN is the only technology recommended by the ICAO. At MUAC, however, both FANS and ATN flights are handled through a dual stack ground system.

2.3  After the publication of the Industry Rapid Reaction Force (IRRF) report, an industry group set up in 2002, 17 points or issues intrinsic to FANS-1/A were identified that could prevent the accommodation of FANS-1/A aircraft into continental high density airspace where ATN-compliant operations are foreseen. The proliferation of FANS- 1/A into continental high density airspace was not stopped, regardless of this list of issues. IFATCA raised objections on the use of FANS-1/A in high density continental airspace. The main reason for this was the fact that not all the previously identified safety concerns and operational problems with the use of FANS were resolved, therefore a safe and efficient traffic handling for those aircraft could not be assured.

2.4  The FAA has decided in 2005 to stop its CPDLC program at Miami Center, a program that was initiated in 2002. The reasons invoked were unexpected maintenance costs and poor aircraft equipage rates. Only 30 aircraft were equipped, while at least 100 airframes were expected on a daily basis. Besides this, there were over 200 equipped aircraft needed so that the benefits would exceed the costs incurred. The approach chosen by the FAA, to favour the voluntary equipage of aircraft, was not successful in an airline industry that was very concerned about the net losses suffered after the September 11th 2001 recession. On the other hand, the European Link2000+ is more successful. The program is now reaching a total of more than 320 CPDLC aircraft equipped today and this is done mainly through financial incentives. “Pioneer airlines” are equipping their fleet with ATN CPDLC capability passing through VDL2. This technology is now considered as the most capable and reliable sub-network that is enabling ATN-based CPDLC-operations. The high equipage rates are a result of the development of the VDL2 technology, a technology which is beneficial to both the airlines operational communications and the Link2000+ CPDLC program. Airlines are adopting this new technology for their own airline communications improvement and with a simple software option they can change over to ATN CPDLC operations. It must be made clear that VDL2 is not only offering a high bandwidth for ATN CPDLC communications when the aircraft is ATN equipped, but also is increasing speed for all ACARS communications including FANS communications when the aircraft is FANS equipped.

Note 1. The ARINC Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) network has been upgrading its capacity for many years now. “Plain Old ACARS (POA)”, used on board of aircraft for airlines’ Aeronautical Operation Control (AOC) has been transmitting over the VHF analog data link network provided by 850 VHF ground stations. The main service providers are ARINC and SITA and the data rate is only of 2,4 kbit/second. Aircraft are now equipping with VDL2 receivers to provide ACARS over aviation VHF link control (ACARS over AVLC, i.e. AOA) with an increased data rate of as much as 31,5 kbit/second. ARINC and SITA are now deploying worldwide new ground stations providing both data rates. Aircraft must either have a Multi purpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU; for Airbus aircraft), or a Dedicated Control Display Unit (DCDU; for Boeing aircraft). In order to process the airlines ACARS applications (AOC), the VHF Digital Radio (VDR) transceiver and a Communications Management Unit (CMU) is used.

Note 2. A simple software upgrade allows the CMU to integrate the ATN functionality for CPDLC messages. The Airbus equivalent to the CMU is called Air Traffic Services Unit (ATSU) and its use allows the full integration of the new FANS-B package. FANS-B has been certified in October 2006 and it is expected that Airbus will equip the 80 Pioneer aircraft with FANS-B by the end of 2007 (airlines such as Finnair, Aeroflot, Alitalia have purchased this option). LINK 2000+ uses the ATN protocol for initial Link2000+ CPDLC applications in high-density continental airspace. It must be said that FANS-B is not an evolution of FANS-1/A. FANS-B is a non- harmonized and non-standardized implementation of data link services and operations and is the particular solution chosen for the European Link2000+ program.

2.5  The Aeronautical Communications Panel (ACP) decided, based on the safety and performance requirements for continental airspace data link, that the standard mode CPDLC specification did not provide enough protection against possible misdelivery of messages. The only possible mitigation found by the LINK2000+ project (and this is also part of the safety case of MUAC) was the procedure that required the pilot to perform a parallel voice read-back for all flight profile-changing clearances. However, voice read-back is undermining the major advantage of CPDLC: the reduction in R/T load. In order to maximise the capacity and safety benefits of CPDLC, a new message protocol had to be developed that does not require a read-back via voice communications.

2.6  The Protected Mode CPDLC (PM-CPDLC) is a modification of the ATN-CPDLC protocol. It ensures that the message is delivered to the intended recipient and without any loss of content integrity. It does not change the CPDLC message set but simply modifies each message by adding in the message header an application checksum based on the Flight ID and the aircraft ICAO 24 bit address. On message delivery the verification of this checksum gives a high quality integrity check and the full assurance that the message has been delivered to the flight intended by the controller. Eurocontrol, the FAA and all the European LINK 2000+ States have supported the replacement of the Standard Mode CPDLC by PM-CPDLC. Operationally speaking the implementation of PM-CPDLC will most probably eliminate the need for voice read-back for flight profile ATC clearances to ATN-compliant aircraft. It must be noted that the FANS-1/A protocol cannot incorporate this Protected Mode.

Note. These aircraft will be promoted from RTCA DO178B Level D Certification to Level C (these levels represent the criticality of an incident happening to any system. This is the design assurance and quality applied to the product). The Link2000+ quality target is level C which implies an “order of magnitude” of producing an undetected error which is significantly lower than with the current Level D requirement.

2.7  IFATCA acknowledges that there are operational benefits associated with the use of FANS in remote and oceanic airspace. SITA and ARINC are offering data link services via ACARS to thousands of aircraft via VHF data link stations globally or Inmarsat satellite services (SATCOM). Besides this, HF Datalink services are also provided in Polar Regions where there is no satellite coverage.

Pre-FANS applications, such as Departure Clearance (DLC) and Oceanic Clearance (OCL), Automatic Digital Terminal Information Service (D-ATIS) all use the ACARS service. Using the ACARS network infrastructure, other applications require the FANS (FANS-1 for Boeing, FANS-A for Airbus) special processing capability, such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract (ADS-C), FANS-CPDLC and also ATS Facilities Notification (AFN). Around 1200 FANS aircraft operate in the Pacific and Atlantic Regions exchanging CPDLC and ADS-C messages with over 20 Air Traffic Service Providers (ATSPs) where only HF voice communications are provided as alternative for communications. FANS offers operational benefits such as automatic surveillance position reports (ADS-Contract (ADS-C)). This permits 30/30 NM reduced separations in the South Pacific (instead of 50 NM) but also flexible tracking to take advantage of forecast winds. Automated safety nets detect flight level and route deviations by using ADS-C event contracts. All these operational benefits are specific to FANS and cannot be achieved by equivalent ATN compliant applications in the very near future.

2.8  There are problems with accommodating FANS aircraft in ATN airspace:

  • To prevent data corruption in a message between the pilot and the onboard ACARS Compatible System (this segment is not verified by the FANS application checksum), a new and extended Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is needed. This CRC has not yet been developed.
  • There are no timers onboard to detect the absence of answer from the pilot/crew after a specified period, which makes the controller and his ground system timers completely and solely responsible for detecting unanswered dialogues.
  • It should also be noted that FANS messages are not answered with a Logical ACKnowledgement (LACK), but with a Message Assurance (MA) that can only reflect the reception of the message in the low levels of the airborne system. An uplink message acknowledged by a MA can well be discarded before being displayed in the cockpit and this without error notification. Experience has shown that the rate of occurrence of this fact is 0.06% of all messages arriving in the low density area.
  • Operationally, the CPDLC-message sets and attributes between FANS and ATN are different. Accommodating both technologies could result in some unexpected message rejections or ambiguities. For instance, the controller sending out a “TURN [direction] [degrees]” to a FANS aircraft would get an error message, because FANS only accepts “TURN [direction] HEADING [degrees]” uplink messages. Or a controller sending out free text messages to a FANS aircraft would have to interpret the answer coming in because the only possible way for a FANS aircraft to answer a free text message is Roger (and not WILCO/Unable or even Affirm/Negative). Operationally this is already considered in some countries as an equivalent to WILCO!

Many differences in the message sets between FANS and ATN aircraft would make it difficult to present the same interface to the controllers handling a mixed data link fleet without degrading the overall performance.

2.9  Based on the IRRF report, and the ensuing heated safety debate for the MUAC FANS-1/A accommodation for continental ATN-airspace, it was concluded that a “latency timer” was needed to detect FANS expired (“out of date”) messages. The risk was that a clearance arrives onboard but is not read immediately by the pilots; the message remains on the display long after the clearance validity has expired and then eventually the pilot reads the message and complies with it. The solution used to mitigate this risk was the voice read-back. In an upgrade to FANS-1/A, the technical solution provided by FANS designers is to include a “latency” timer, a timestamp in each message that helps detect when the pilot does not give an answer within a specified period (usually 120 seconds). That change was named FANS-1/A+ and is now delivered to all new aircraft since 2005 and proposed as a retrofit on existing FANS-1/A equipped aircraft. This improvement eliminates the risk of out-of- date messages, but this retrofit is not mandatory for the time being.

2.10  Even with the FANS-1/A+ upgrade mentioned above, there is still the second risk that justified the use of voice read-back as mitigation action: misdelivery of FANS messages. When a controller wants to send a CPDLC message to an aircraft, she/he selects on his display the Flight ID (the callsign). The ground system is responsible for initiating the transfer to the aircraft but it must determine first the network address of the aircraft. For ATN aircraft, the network address is the ATN address whereas for FANS aircraft, this is the Registration Number (the Tail Number, or ship number as North Americans would say).

Using the information received from the aircraft at the logon time (Flight ID & ATN address for ATN aircraft, or Flight ID & Registration Number for FANS aircraft) and maintained in an addressing data base, the ground system retrieves the network address from the flight ID (this is the Flight ID / Tail Number correlation). Many errors can occur during this correlation:

  • Software error when creating the CPDLC message
  • Loss of integrity in the Flight Plan Database
  • Undetected use of out-of-date flight plan messages or AFN (ATS Facilities Notification, the FANS equivalent for Context Management)
  • Errors in the distribution or the processing of AFN messages

FDPS distribution errors and out-of-date information cannot easily be mitigated by software assurance and have an accumulative effect: a single error in the chain of functions performing this Flight ID / Tail Number correlation can result in a wrong Tail Number returned to the Flight Data Processor from the data base.

The Flight Data Processor then forms the CPDLC message, including the false Tail Number in the message header and the message checksum. The message will be delivered to the aircraft with the wrongly selected Tail Number and the onboard verification of the checksum’s and the message header’s Tail Number will be satisfactory. If the received message is a profile changing message and appears applicable in context, the crew will comply with it, potentially leading to a hazard.

With ATN aircraft, PM-CPDLC adds in each message checksum the Flight ID. If there is a wrong Flight ID / ATN address correlation by the ground Flight Data Processor and the message is sent to a wrong ATN address, it is easy to detect the misdelivery onboard thanks to the difference between the message checksum incorrect Flight ID and the aircraft actual Flight ID. FANS messages only include the Tail Number which is at the same time used for addressing, so the lack of the Flight ID is a critical FANS deficiency to detect messages misdeliveries.

At this stage, no FANS-1/A+ upgrade is foreseen to solve the misdelivery issue. This means that the safety argument against the accommodation of FANS into ATN continental high density airspace remains very valid.

2.11  EUROCAE has published a document (PU-40) on accommodation of FANS-1/A+ aircraft over ATN in continental airspace and Sofréavia has conducted a safety assessment for European airspace based on continental safety requirements. In order to keep the target risk of FANS misdelivery within the limits of “acceptable” (< 1 x 10-5 per Flight Hour, i.e. 1 misdelivered message in 100000 messages exchanged in one hour), the amount of FANS-1/A+ aircraft must be limited to less than 5% of the total ATN & FANS CPDLC flights: this is a calculation based on the occurrence of a FDPS erroneous selection of the wrong Tail Number assumed to be “probable” i.e. < 1 x 10-3 per Flight Hour, the proportion of clearances among other messages assumed to be 30% and the probability of a mis-delivered clearance being applicable in context assumed to be 50%. This safety analysis concludes that the only way to support a safe accommodation of FANS-1/A+ aircraft would be to limit the number of the FANS-aircraft so that the risk of a FANS message hazardous misdelivery risk does not exceed 1 in 100000 per hour. In this situation, 95% of the data link fleet would be composed of ATN aircraft with no risk of message misdelivery, and a maximum of 5% could be FANS aircraft, so that the total risk of message misdelivery for the whole fleet remains limited to 1 in 100000 per hour. This Sofréavia safety report recommends that:

“Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) must undertake measures so that no data link exchanges with FANS-1/A+ aircraft occur if the simultaneous number of such flights is exceeding 5% of the overall data link equipped fleet”.

This procedure would imply the development of new means to monitor the amount of FANS aircraft and the elaboration of rules and technical solutions to deny CPDLC logons to more FANS aircraft if this number is exceeded. It is the opinion of TOC that 5% more data link aircraft will bring only a limited benefit in R/T load reduction and a very small amount of flights, compared to the hazard represented by FANS aircraft. Besides this, PM-CPDLC has been designed for ATN aircraft to eliminate this risk of message misdelivery, and voice read-back will not be necessary any more for ATN aircraft when PM-CPDLC is implemented. It is not conceivable to continue using voice read-back for FANS-1/A+ aircraft only, so accommodating FANS aircraft means tolerating this risk with no possibility to detect the misdelivery.

2.12  CPDLC services should not be offered to FANS aircraft once voice read-back is removed in high density continental ATN airspace and R/T voice communications for these aircraft is the only solution. From a procedural point of view, State aircraft and small business aircraft will be exempted, at least initially, from CDPLC carriage and will have to be handled anyhow via R/T voice. Moreover, if the PU-40 safety analysis is followed, CPDLC with FANS aircraft would be limited to 5% of the total data link fleet. Many additional FANS aircraft would then be refused CPDLC when the 5% threshold is reached and would logically be handled via R/T voice, just like exempted aircraft. This is a form of “mixed-mode operations”, and IFATCA opposes to such operations. The problem is that there is no solution available at this stage. Flights using FANS in oceanic airspace and next entering continental ATN-airspace would then have to revert to VHF-voice instead of using FANS-CPDLC, hazardous without voice read-back. There are strong justifications to opt for this solution as it will not degrade safety and will not affect the performance of CPDLC and datalink service due to risks associated with misdelivery issues. It must be said that this is only a temporary “fix”, while a safe and harmonized global solution is being developed.

2.13  An interesting initiative to address accommodations problems is the ICAO ATN Accommodation Drafting Group (ADG), a drafting group created by the Data Link Steering Group (DLSG). The objective of this group is to develop a harmonized datalink service, converging the FANS-1/A and ATN datalink systems. ADG was established to assess the feasibility of accommodating ATN aircraft in a FANS environment. Currently, the ADG is evaluating the deficiencies of the ATN Baseline 1 interoperability standards preventing the operational use of ATN in oceanic FANS airspace:

  • Some oceanic essential CPDLC messages are not included in ATN Baseline 1.
  • FANS-1/A ADS-C allows automatic position-reporting contracts and has a much finer resolution than the ATN equivalent.
  • ATN ADS-C needs to be at the appropriate quality of service (integrity level) for route conformance monitoring and to detect loss of separation. The ICAO Aeronautical Communications Panel (ACP) is investigating the feasibility of a Protected Mode ADS to protect against undetected failures of the ATN ADS application.
  • ATN aircraft will be required to use satellite communications in oceanic airspace, meaning that their avionics will have to be modified to add the capability to use Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Data 3.
  • ATN aircraft do not have FMS CPDLC integration and automation (including auto- load and auto-trigger of position reports from the FMS). Manual position reports are not conceivable in oceanic airspace.

All of this shows that the current interoperability standards for ATN are only a first step and will eventually need to be further developed to take the oceanic operational needs into account.

2.14  IFATCA policy on Datalink CPDLC communications is:

“All implementations of CPDLC must demonstrate full compliance with ICAO ATN SARPs. However, in Oceanic and Remote Regions, where it can be demonstrated that CPDLC implementation improves controller-pilot communications, it is recognized that non ATN compliant technologies may be deployed during a transitional phase”

The ICAO ATN SARPs and their progressive development form the definitive basis for any future CPDLC implementation.”

 

2.15 The Policy statements above, established in times of technological uncertainties in the developments of data link technologies, has not been proven wrong by recent developments:

  • FANS-1/A+ upgrade still has “deficiencies” that ATN Protected Mode CPDLC has already solved (the misdelivery risk)
  • “proliferation” of FANS operations in continental airspace poses a safety threat without voice read-back mitigation (and we disapprove of the 5% FANS limit mitigation)
  • in continental airspace ATN PM-CPDLC is safe enough to “form the definitive basis”
  • in “oceanic and remote regions” ATN SARPs will obviously need “developments” to adapt to oceanic airspace specificities (future ADG work)

Therefore TOC recommends to adapt the Policy in such a way that it reflects the concern on accommodating FANS aircraft without the voice read-back to mitigate the risk of clearance mis-delivery to a wrong data link aircraft:

It is proposed to add the following:

“In high density ATN CPDLC airspace, FANS aircraft shall be handled via voice R/T for safety reasons.”

Conclusions

3.1  Regional CPDLC implementations in high density continental airspace (e.g. in Miami and Europe) have highlighted the importance of high equipage rates for any successful CPDLC implementation. Therefore, it is a good sign that more and more airlines equip their fleet with VDL2 for CPDLC. It is regrettable that this is only confined to the European Region and that no other global programme for use of CPDLC based on ATN is planned.

3.2  FANS technology has evolved to try and meet ATN requirements. The FANS-1/A+ upgrade has solved the out-of-date messages issue but the risk of clearances misdelivery still remains unresolved. Instead of limiting the number of FANS aircraft as the PU-40 Safety Analysis recommends in order to mitigate this risk, it is preferable to revert to voice R/T with FANS transoceanic aircraft inside high density continental airspace. It is regrettable that such a mixed mode operation between ATN aircraft handled via CPDLC and FANS aircraft handled via voice R/T (along with small and State aircraft) is at this stage the only solution, but no safe alternative for the accommodation of FANS aircraft in that airspace has been proposed so far.

3.3  In oceanic airspace, the operational benefits of FANS are fully acknowledged and recognized. FANS in that environment obviously cannot be replaced as long as ATN cannot meet and match the same operational standards and performances as FANS.

3.4  ATN standards are regularly evaluated and improved to increase efficiency and reliability. For instance, PM-CPDLC is eliminating the risk of message misdeliveries, so that voice read-back mitigation is not necessary any more. There are nevertheless still many problems to be solved before ATN can be used in oceanic and remote areas. The ICAO ATN ADG develops the new ATN specifications needed for oceanic operations, and are searching for a safe and operational solution for a datalink convergence from ATN & FANS to new ATN standards. Till the moment those solutions are found, IFATCA should monitor the developments.

Recommendations

It is recommended that;

4.1  IFATCA Policy on page 3 2 4 11 of the IFATCA Manual:

All implementations of CPDLC must demonstrate full compliance with ICAO ATN SARPs. However, in Oceanic and Remote Regions, where it can be demonstrated that CPDLC implementation improves controller-pilot communications, it is recognized that non ATN compliant technologies may be deployed during a transitional phase.

The ICAO ATN SARPs and their progressive development form the definitive basis for any future CPDLC implementation.

is deleted.

4.2  IFATCA Policy is:

All implementations of CPDLC must demonstrate full compliance with ICAO ATN SARPs. However, in Oceanic and Remote Regions, where it can be demonstrated that CPDLC implementation improves controller pilot communications, it is recognized that non ATN compliant technologies may be deployed during a transitional phase.

The ICAO ATN SARPs and their progressive development form the definitive basis for any future CPDLC implementation.

In high density ATN CPDLC airspace, FANS aircraft shall be handled via voice R/T for safety reasons.

and is included in the IFATCA Manual on page 3 2 4 11.

References

ICAO Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Volume III, – Communication Systems, Part I – Digital Data Communication Systems, First Edition – July 1995, Amendment 73 – Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN).

ICAO Doc. 9705-AN/956 – Manual of Technical Provisions for the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network; Edition 2, December 1999.

Interoperability Requirements Standard for ATN Baseline 1 (INTEROP ATN B1), Revision A, EUROCAE ED-110A / RTCA DO-280A (August 2004).

Safety and Performance Requirements Standard For Initial Air Traffic Data Link Services In Continental Airspace (SPR IC), RTCA DO-290 / EUROCAE ED-120 (May 2004).

Interoperability Requirements for ATS Applications using ARINC 622 Data Communications, EUROCAE ED-100A (April 2005).

LINK Baseline 1, LINK 2000+/PM/BASELINE/1, version 1.1 (April 2005).

FANS 1/A+ a/c accommodation in ATN Baseline 1 ground systems – RTCA/EUROCAE draft PU40.

Last Update: September 29, 2020  

April 12, 2020   287   Jean-Francois Lepage    2007    

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