Aerodrome – Land and Hold Short Operations

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Aerodrome – Land and Hold Short Operations

46TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, Istanbul, Turkey, 16-20 April 2007

WP No. 86

Aerodrome – Land and Hold Short Operations

Presented by TOC

Summary

At the 2005 IFATCA Conference in Melbourne, Germany expressed concern with regard to the safe operation of Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO) and requested that the Technical and Operations Committee (TOC) study LAHSO. TOC has concluded that much of the criticism levelled at LAHSO are questions about airborne separation between flights operating simultaneously on multiple runways and need to be considered separately. This paper focuses solely on separation at the intersection of intersecting runways. It also proposes IFATCA definitions for various terms that are used to discuss operations on converging runways, and defines controller and pilot obligations and workload while conducting LAHSO.

Introduction

1.1 Two related topics are Simultaneous Intersecting Runway Operations (SIRO) and Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO). Other terms, such as Simultaneous Operations on Intersecting/Converging Runways (SIMOPS) and Simultaneous Operations on Intersecting Runways (SOIR) have also been used. All are related to achieving maximum use of runways, whilst maintaining safety.

1.2 It is expected that, in order to minimize the effect of airports being a restriction on the growth of air traffic, SIRO and LAHSO will be expanded and extended. It is therefore appropriate for IFATCA to review its policy on SIRO and study LAHSO. Due to the scope of the subject, TOC has decided to cover the issue in two separate Working Papers. This Paper is only about LAHSO, ie. Intersecting runway and taxiway operations on the ground.

1.3 At the 2005 IFATCA Conference in Melbourne, Germany expressed concern with regard to the safe operation of LAHSO and requested that the Technical and Operations Committee (TOC) study LAHSO.

1.4 TOC could not reach an agreement on a Working Paper for last year’s Annual Conference in Kaohsiung. Instead EVP Technical presented his personal views on LAHSO. It was however agreed that TOC should resume work on reviewing LAHSO policy for the 2007 Annual Conference in Istanbul.

1.5 Airborne operations of intersecting and/or converging runways are being dealt with in a separate Paper (B.5.3). LAHSO is considered to be a subset of Converging Runways Operations (CROPS).

Discussion

2.1 SIRO and LAHSO – Definitions and Differences

2.1.1 SIRO and LAHSO are not the same, although many incorrectly consider SIRO to simply be the old term for LAHSO.

2.1.2 There are no official definitions in ICAO or other documents for SIRO and LAHSO, so the following definitions are proposed for inclusion in the IFATCA Manual.

2.1.2.1 SIRO is defined as:

”the simultaneous use of intersecting runways for take-off and/or landing”.

Note 1: SIRO means that the runways are used at the same time (simultaneously) and not sequentially.

Note 2: SIRO is about surface intersections and not airborne intersections.

Regarding Note 1:

Sequential use of intersecting runways is the ”traditional” use of runways when the full length of the runway (or the remaining length of runway for an intersection departure) is available to the first aircraft and that an operation by a second aircraft on an intersecting runway is not available until the first aircraft has ceased using the runway intersection. The first aircraft will finish using the runway intersection when it has passed the intersection, or exited the runway prior to the intersection, or, for a landing aircraft, has stopped short of the intersection.

Regarding Note 2:

To use the term SIRO precisely, the runways must intersect. Airborne crossings, that is of departure, arrival and missed approach paths, without runways intersecting are not SIRO operations. If the runways do not intersect (and are not parallel) then the term ”converging runway operations” is used.

2.1.2.2 LAHSO is defined as:

”an operation that has an Air Traffic Control (ATC) requirement for a landing aircraft to stop short of the full length of the runway”.

Note 1: ”Stop short” can be to hold short of a crossing runway, a taxiway or any other point.

Note 2: The landing aircraft is still expected to exit at the first available (or nominated) taxiway – or at least come to a stop on the runway prior to the nominated position.

2.1.3 The lack of definitions for SIRO and LAHSO has resulted in variations in exactly what operations are being referred to. For example, the USA used the term SIRO (or SOIR) initially and then changed to LAHSO.

2.1.4 Although the terms SIRO and LAHSO appear self-explanatory, different implementations have been used which limit the operations to a subset of all possible operations under that term. For example, SIRO tends to be used for two landing aircraft rather than for two departing aircraft and LAHSO is not used to permit surface operations in Australia (but in the USA may be used to allow an aircraft or vehicle to cross a runway beyond the hold short point). Allowed operations may be expanded in future.

2.1.5 SIRO and LAHSO depend on the configuration of the runway and so SIRO and LAHSO are limited to particular airports and particular runway configurations. The exact requirements for what are acceptable airport and runway configurations has yet to be defined. Sometimes local operations are misunderstood as generic (or global) operations.


2.2 ICAO Position

2.2.1 The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) does not appear to use the terms SIRO and LAHSO in its Manuals.

2.2.2 ICAO PANS ATM Doc 4444 allows for LAHSO-like operations. Landing and roll-out manoeuvres (paragraph 7.9.3) states:

“7.9.3.1 When necessary or desirable to expedite traffic, a landing aircraft may be requested to:

a) hold short of an intersecting runway after landing…”

2.2.3 The ICAO Air Navigation Commission (ANC) has assigned the Operations Panel (OPSP), with the following task:

“(OPS-0007 2) Increasing aerodrome capacity.

Review operational aspects of existing provisions and proposals aimed at improving aerodrome capacity, including but not limited to: […]

”b) proposals for independent use of intersecting runways in land and hold short (LAHSO) operations.”

2.2.4 There appears to be no ICAO work on common lighting and signs required for LAHSO operations. SASP 6 talks about the distance from which to see the LAHSO signage and lighting, but not what those actually look like.

2.2.5 There is an ICAO manual on Simultaneous Operations on parallel or near-parallel Instrument Runways, Doc 9643. Note this is not for intersecting runways or converging runways. The similarity of SIRO and SOIR has sometimes resulted in the incorrect term being used in discussion of SIRO. In addition the FAA previously used SOIR for Simultaneous Operations on Intersecting Runways – that is what ICAO uses SIRO for.


2.3 IFATCA Policy

2.3.1 There is IFATCA policy for Simultaneous IFR Operations on Intersecting / Converging Runways. As the policy deals with Converging Runways it covers more than just SIRO. IFATCA policy does not specifically mention LAHSO, but existing policy could be understood to include LAHSO. The policy dates from 1988 and was last amended in 1996.

2.3.2 The 1995 (Jerusalem) WP 89 ”Review existing policy and develop further policy on simultaneous IFR operations on Intersecting / Converging Runways” identified three conflict points for departure-and-landing and landing-and-landing situations: “at the runway crossing point, in the missed approach and in case of a baulked landing.”

2.3.3 It is not proposed to delete or amend existing IFATCA policy, however additional policy will be proposed. The existing IFATCA policy statements can be seen as general requirements, and should apply to all aerodrome operations, not just SIRO or LAHSO. If policy is required for LAHSO then it should be explicitly stated.


2.4 Dependent, Independent and Segregated

2.4.1 When discussing parallel runway operations, ICAO uses three terms – dependent, independent and segregated. The terms however are not defined in relation to SIRO nor LAHSO, and so the following definitions are proposed for inclusion in the IFATCA Manual.

2.4.2 A dependent runway operation is when a clearance or instruction to a landing or departing aircraft is conditional (dependent) on an action of another aircraft or vehicle.

2.4.3 An independent runway operation is when a clearance or instruction to a landing or departing aircraft is not constrained by consideration of the position or cleared route of any other aircraft or vehicle.

Note 1: Independence requires that if a rejected landing, missed approach, etc is executed by one or more aircraft then there is still no constraint on the aircraft receiving the clearance or instruction.

Note 2: Independence does not have to take into account emergencies and noncompliance with clearances – which will be managed as required.

2.4.4 An avoidance procedure is to prevent aircraft collision but does not necessarily use an Air Traffic Control (ATC) separation standard.

Note: The procedure must demonstrate the required safety established by safety analysis and then be formally approved for use.

2.4.5 An example of a segregated parallel runway operation on staggered runways is that runway centre-lines are spaced at least 730m apart and that the missed approach path of a landing aircraft diverges by at least 30 degrees from the departure track of the aircraft taking off. Something similar may be used in relation to converging runway missed approaches.

2.4.6 A Rejected Landing Procedures (RLP) is a documented and published heading procedure used when one or more aircraft involved in the procedure are unable to land whereby the trajectory of the aircraft is guided clear of possible conflicting traffic and their wake turbulence. This procedure would normally be flown visually, however terrain clearance may be provided by the FMS as new approach technologies (ie RNP) become more commonplace. Unless alternate instructions are given by ATC, pilots are expected to execute the procedure as published and remain clear of clouds. ATC should keep the RLP track clear of other aircraft (see also 2.6.3 below).


2.5 LAHSO – General

2.5.1 LAHSO has been used in various forms for at least 37 years (for example, LAHSO started in 1968 in the USA). The USA Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that LAHSO increases throughput by 10%. In 2000, LAHSO was used at more than 220 airports in the USA with almost 850 intersecting runway configurations. LAHSO is used today in Australia, Canada and the USA. LAHSO has been investigated in Europe (for example for operations at Schiphol). So far, however, LAHSO procedures are only used in the UK at Aberdeen, where the only aircraft using LAHSO are helicopters, and Germany, where the procedures are restricted to aircraft of a maximum 2000 kg MTOW operating on a remaining runway length of at least 2200 metres.

2.5.2 LAHSO depends on airport configuration and runway layout. Just because LAHSO is used at an airport does not imply that it is used in all runway configurations.

2.5.3 There are currently no global LAHSO standards. For example the USA use nine categories of landing aircraft (based on landing distance required) and Australia has three categories (based on approach performance).

2.5.4 LAHSO has evolved over time and changed on the basis of experience. For example, USA Air Line Pilots Association and Air Transport Association had major concerns about LAHSO operations in the USA but in February 1999 reached a new agreement with the FAA covering weather and runway surfaces, training, visual aids (including improved lighting for LAHSO), greater landing distances and handling rejected landings.

2.5.5 For this paper, LAHSO is considered in its widest meaning, that is

”an operation that has an ATC requirement for a landing aircraft to stop short of the full length of the runway“.

The reason for holding short is currently mainly used in relation to take-off or landing on intersecting/converging runways, however the points raised in this paper are not limited to these cases.


2.6 Consequences of rejected landing/missed approach

2.6.1 The handling of rejected landings and missed approaches must be considered as part of normal operations of LAHSO.

2.6.2 There are varying definitions for rejected landings. For example the Flight Safety Foundation defines:

”a rejected landing (also called an aborted landing) is a goaround manoeuvre initiated after touchdown of the main landing gear” (also referred to as a ”bounce”)

whereas others consider, such as in the U.S., rejected landings as an airborne decision to not land, usually at low level, and to be pilot initiated. IFATCA itself has also used the term “baulked landing” as mentioned above, but has also failed to actually define the term. This confusion needs to be solved. Therefore, the following definitions are being proposed for inclusion in the IFATCA Manual:

A “Missed approach” is an instrument-based procedure that a pilot has to follow after initiating a go-around at or above the Decision Height or Minimum descent height.

A “Rejected” or “Baulked Landing” is a manoeuvre where the pilot, after having passed the minimum of a IFR approach, aborts the landing and initiates a go-around, or is being asked by ATC to go around. Note: This means that such a manoeuvre could still be initiated after touchdown and/or during aircraft rollout.

2.6.3 In the U.S.A., LAHSO procedures include a rejected landing procedure to ensure segregation. The USA defines the rejected landing procedure as:

”a published, predetermined heading to be used in the event of a rejected landing. Unless alternative instructions are given by the controller, pilots are expected to execute the procedure as published and remain clear of clouds” (FAA 7110.118 paragraph 8.).

Note that this procedure is different from the standard missed approach procedure and, even though it might be instrument based, requires the pilot to remain in VMC.

2.6.4 From a controller’s point of view, all missed approach procedures (obviously including rejected landing procedures) should be planned in a way that provides at least avoidance without intervention by the aerodrome controller. This must be true for all runway configurations. Consider single runway operations, where a missed approach could result in a situation where a jet, after executing a missed approach, has to follow a missed approach procedure that makes it catch a previously departed prop aircraft. If this is true for single runway operations, it also applies to dependent or independent operations on several runways. In this respect LAHSO in itself is not actually any different from any other kind of runway operation (single, parallel, converging, intersecting). Any kind of aerodrome operation is bound to put aircraft very close to one another, and LAHSO in itself does not necessarily decrease that distance any further. The rest of this paper will therefore focus on the one point that is unique to LAHSO.


2.7 Separation at the intersection

2.7.1 The one point that set LAHSO apart from any other runway operation that it takes the obligation for separation at the intersection away from the controller and puts it solely into the pilots’ hands.

2.7.2 One could argue that this is essentially true for all other forms of separation as well. The ground controller who instructs an aircraft to “taxi as number two behind …” relies on the pilot to follow the traffic in question. The same applies to an area controller who applies vertical separation. If the pilot deviates from his or her assign altitude or flight level, a loss of separation will occur. If you look at it this way, you could even say that our sole means of control is to delegate the obligation for separation to the pilot. We devise the plan, but the pilots are effectively performing the separation business by adhering to our clearances. So why not extend this to LAHSO as well? The answer: “Normal” separation standards include a buffer that allows for an infringement of those minima without a imminent risk of collision. However, if an aircraft rolls though an intersection, the error margin is virtually nonexistent.


2.8 Pilot workload

2.8.1 One area of debate is the Available Landing Distance (ALD) and the consequences of not holding short. The U.S. define the ALD as ”that portion of the runway available for landing and roll-out for aircraft cleared for LAHSO” (FAA 7110.118 paragraph 8).

2.8.2 The pilot has the final authority to say whether a runway is suitable for landing. The various factors that determine whether the runway length is suitable (altitude, slope, braking action, wind, temperature, etc) are the same for whether the full length of the runways is available or a reduced length (LAHSO ALD).

2.8.3 There are on-going discussions in various aviation fora about over-run protection, and this also applies to the full length of a runway. One argument that is often cited in favour of LAHSO is that, even with runways that do not actually intersect, an overrun on one runway could result in an aircraft ending up on a physically independent, adjacent runway. One example of such a runway layout would be Frankfurt, Germany. If independent operation on closely spaced “non-crossing” runways are acceptable, why is LAHSO not?

2.8.4 The German AIP, as mentioned above, does generally not allow LAHSO operations, but it allows for one exception: When the landing aircraft is a piston-driven aircraft of less than 2t MPTOW, and the distance between the runway threshold and the intersecting runway (taxiways may not be used as hold-short points) is at least 2200 metres. This is more or less three times the normal landing and rollout distance for this kind of aircraft. Additionally, traffic information has to be issued to both aircraft in question. Nothing else is required, and no special lighting and signage have to be in place.

2.8.5 Any hold short point would need to be clearly identifiable by the pilot. However, there are no ICAO requirements for lighting and signs to indicate clearly to the pilot the hold short point. And yet work is already afoot to reduce the distance from which the pilot of a LAHSO aircraft must be able to see that point. The OPSP 7 report states:

“The problem was identified as the wording of the OPSP/6 Report, Agenda Item 2, Appendix C, page 2C-3, paragraph 1.3.1 d) which states: “the LAHSO hold-short point markings shall be continuously visible to a pilot from a distance of at least 5 km (2.8 NM) before the LAHSO hold-short point” and in Appendix D, page 2D-3 paragraph 7.9.5.2.3.1 which states “…(lights, marks and signs)…These must enable a pilot making an approach and landing to identify and thereafter maintain visual contact with the LAHSO hold-short point continuously from at least 5 km (2.8) NM before the LAHSO hold-short point by day or night.”

The VAP review had concluded that it was not possible to guarantee that once sighted at the 5 km required distance, the visual aids (lights, markings and signs) would be “continuously visible”, as environmental and other factors such as the runway profile, etc., could interrupt the continuous visibility of these markings. Such factors could also include low-lying clouds and fog or vehicles on or near the runway environment. Having reached this conclusion, work on this item was suspended. […] In response to a question from the AP concerning visibility of LAHSO lighting, it was confirmed that at OPSP/WG/WHL/5 it was stated that:

“the requirement was intended to indicate that the pilot must be able to see the LAHSO hold-short point from a distance of not less than 1000 metres at a pilot’s eye height of 2 metres. Runways with longitudinal gradients that preclude continuous visual reference to the LAHSO hold-short point from a distance of not less than 1 000 metres at a pilot’s eye height of 2 metres were not considered acceptable for LAHSO”. Furthermore, the AP would not need to consider the issue of continuous visual reference from 1 000 m to the hold-short point as this is an operational approval issue and not a lighting or marking issue”.

2.8.6 The bottom line of this is that any hold short point might very well not be easily discernible from the cockpit. LAHSO in its present implementation in the U.S. and Australia is based on the principle that only certain carriers (usually the nationals) may participate in LAHSO operations. However, as tower controllers all over the world will be able to testify, there are lots of examples where even local pilots can get confused with the aerodrome layout even during taxi. The number one cause for RUNWAY incursions is pilots confused about where exactly on the airport they are.

2.8.7 If the above is true for taxi operations, it must also be considered for LAHSO. However, the landing aircraft is a much more dynamic environment. Reaction times for pilots and controllers are substantially shorter than during taxi or even during flight. The main objective for the pilot if to safely get the aircraft onto the runway. The very nature of the landing process is that a flying object is operated very close to the ground at high speed, at its most vulnerable. This high workload environment is then made even more complex by adding the requirement of clearly identifying a point maybe 2000 metres down the runway. Even if the manufacturer’s landings distance is significantly less that the ALD, any external influence could eat that buffer away very clearly.

2.8.8 There is the report in the 1995 IFATCA paper that the Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation recommended:

”pilots landing on intersecting runways can pass through the intersection without risk of collision should their aircraft fail to stop before the intersection as required”.

The reason for such as statement is understandable, and the intent is for there never to be a situation where two aircraft are simultaneously at the intersection. It is difficult to judge the time at the intersection given that even on short final the speed can vary from landing and slowing, to a ”bounce” and late landing, to go-around power and then a change to landing. Some sort of standard for segregation or separation that could be measured in advance would be required in order for this to be reliably complied with.


2.9 Controller Workload

2.9.1 It is clearly established that the Pilot-in-Command has final authority in relation to the safety of the flight. It also is recognized that the pilot is the authority on the performance of their aircraft. In general, if a pilot advises that he is ”unable to comply” with an ATC instruction or ”operationally requires” then this is accepted by the controller and an alternative instruction given. This information from the pilot should be given as soon as possible.

2.9.2 The controller is responsible for separation during the approach and on the runway. However, he relies on the pilot to actually hold short of a specified point. The controller still has an increased workload because of his responsibility to ensure that the pilot is kept informed of operationally significant changes, such as wind, braking conditions, etc. This is made more critical by the fact that the desire to implement LAHSO is generally higher at congested airports where workload is already high anyway. There are no studies on whether the increased workload on passing LAHSO related information is offset by the fact that controllers do not have to actively establish separation while LAHSO are in force.

2.9.3 The controller workload is increased even further by the fact that not all aircraft are willing to or capable of accepting LAHSO even while LAHSO is generally in force, forcing the controller to apply different separation standards at the same time. He/she also has to continuously consider the option that pilots who have announced themselves LAHSO capable might renounce that status at any time because of changes in the environment that might or might not be easily identifiable to the controller.


2.10 Safety

2.10.1 Measurement of safety is still something that cannot always be achieved. For example, some argue that using less than the full length of the runway (for landing or taking off) is less safe than using the full length. However to establish the difference as a numerical measure is not yet reliably possible.

2.10.2 Often the safety objective is to maintain the current level of safety, or of improving the level of safety. If using less than the full length of the runway is considered less safe, by however small a margin, even if not provable numerically, then intersection departures and land and hold short are not possible.

2.10.3 However another way to assess the safety is that aircraft operate from and to varying lengths of runway at every airport. There are well established procedures that allow for calculation of a safe length for take off and for landing.

2.10.4 The difference with intersecting or converging runways operations are the consequences of failing to hold short and the handling of rejected landings. Each of these must be addressed to ensure an acceptable level of safety is achieved.

2.10.5 The long experience of using LAHSO in the USA has created well established procedures for implementing LAHSO. No references have been found for any accident relating to LAHSO operations in the USA.

2.10.6 In Australia there were a number of incidents with SIMOPS, a precursor to LAHSO. Australian LAHSO procedures have been modified accordingly. However important issues, such as rejected landing procedures, need further work.


2.11 IFATCA Policy and LAHSO

2.11.1 IFATCA policy is for Simultaneous Operations on Intersecting/Converging Runways. The inclusion of converging runways (as well as intersecting runways) in the title means that LAHSO in included under this title, even though LAHSO is not specifically mentioned.

2.11.2 The main safety concerns with LAHSO, that is the consequences of not holding short and the consequences of a rejected landing, are covered under existing policy paragraph d ”that specific procedures are introduced that will ensure that the approach sequence to each runway can be managed in such a way that each aircraft will be able to continue its approach, landing and possible missed approach safely”. However this paragraph is so generic that it could be used for any approach operations at an airport, including parallel runways.

2.11.3 If LAHSO has any special requirements or is not to be included under this policy then LAHSO policy must be explicitly stated.

2.11.4 The study of LAHSO has identified the U.S.A.-requirement that LAHSO not be implemented unless there is an operational need. This approach seems applicable to LAHSO, SIRO and other operations designed to increase capacity safely but do so by reducing safety margins. For example, sequential operations can never meet at the intersection/overrun – only simultaneous operations can potentially meet.

2.11.5 The study of LAHSO has identified the U.S.A.-use of rejected landing procedures. Rejected landing procedures have only been briefly introduced in this paper, and there are additional requirements for the U.S.A.-rejected landing procedures, for example the point from which the rejected landing is initiated.

2.11.6 The issue of dependent segregation has also been discussed, and highlighted a need for policy. It is important that there be avoidance or separation (not just traffic information) and responsibilities must be defined.

2.11.7 Existing generic policy on simultaneous runway operations would benefit from adding policy on only when needed, rejected landing procedures, dependent and independent operations, and avoidance.

Conclusions

3.1 Definitions for SIRO, LAHSO, dependent and independent runway operations and avoidance procedures, as well as for missed approaches and rejected landings should be included in the IFATCA Manual and be used in future to assist in discussion of this subject.

3.2 There are six main areas of concern to LAHSO:

  1. SIRO and LAHSO depend on the configuration of the runway and so SIRO and LAHSO are limited to particular airports and particular runway configurations. The exact requirements for what are acceptable airport and runway configurations have yet to be defined.
  2. The “hold short point” might not be easily identifiable to the pilots.
  3. “Rejected landings” as defined above are much more common than aircraft veering off or overshooting a runway. An aircraft going around after touchdown, during the rollout, or even after “floating” along the runway without the pilot managing to get it down for whatever reason could easily result in passing “through” rather than above the intersection.
  4. In order for pilots to accept and execute LAHSO, controllers need to pass a lot of LAHSO-specific information to pilot, which leads to an increase in controller workload.
  5. The problem of controllers’ continually having to adjust between LAHSO and non-LAHSO operations, based on pilots’ and airline ability to participate in LAHSO operations could lead to a less stable “mixed-mode” work environment.
  6. They also have to continuously consider the option that aircraft that are LAHSO capable, might renounce that status at any time because of changes in the environment that might or might not be easily identifiable to the controller.

Recommendations

It is recommended that;

4..1 The following definition of Land and Hold Short Operation:

Land and Hold Short Operation (LAHSO) is an operation that has an Air Traffic Control (ATC) requirement for a landing aircraft to stop short of the full length of the runway.

is included on page 3 2 2 1 of the IFATCA Manual.

4.2 The following definition of Simultaneous Intersecting Runway Operations:

Simultaneous Intersecting Runway Operations is ”the simultaneous use of intersecting runways for take-off and/or landing”.

is included on page 3 2 2 1 of the IFATCA Manual.

4.3 The following definition of Dependent runway operation:

A dependent runway operation is when a clearance or instruction to a landing or departing aircraft is conditional on an action of another aircraft or vehicle.

is included in the IFATCA Manual on page 3 2 2 1.

4.4 The following definition of Independent runway operation:

An independent runway operation is when a clearance or instruction to a landing or departing aircraft is not conditional on an action of another aircraft or vehicle.

is included in the IFATCA Manual on page 3 2 2 1.

4.5 Avoidance Procedure is defined as:

An Avoidance Procedure is a designed procedure to prevent aircraft collision but does not necessarily use an air traffic control (ATC) separation standard.

is included on page 3 2 2 1 of the IFATCA Manual.

4.6 The following definition of Missed approach:

A “Missed approach” is an instrument-based procedure that a pilot has to follow after initiating a go-around at or above the Decision Height or Minimum descent height.

is included on page 3 2 2 1 of the IFATCA Manual.

4.7 The following definition of Rejected landing:

A “Rejected” or “Baulked Landing” is a manoeuvre where the pilot, after having passed the minimum of a IFR approach, aborts the landing and initiates a go-around, or is asked by ATC to go around.

is included on page 3 2 2 1 of the IFATCA Manual.

4.8. IFATCA Policy is:

IFATCA opposes LAHSO unless the following concerns have been satisfactorily addressed:

  • The lack of exact requirements for what are acceptable airport and runway configurations;
  • The “hold short point” is not always easily identifiable to the pilots;
  • An aircraft going around after touch-down, during the rollout, or even after “floating” along the runway without the pilot managing to get it down for whatever reason could result in passing “through” rather than above the intersection;
  • Increase in controller workload as a result of controllers having to pass LAHSO-specific information to the pilot;
  • Controllers continually having to adjust between LAHSO and non-LAHSO operations, based on pilots’ and airline ability to participate in LAHSO operations; and
  • Operational difficulties associated with LAHSO capable aircraft renouncing the status at a late stage.

and is included on page 3 2 2 1 of the IFATCA Manual.

Last Update: September 29, 2020  

April 13, 2020   359   Jean-Francois Lepage    2007    

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