AAS 1.3 MODE S DEVELOPMENT

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AAS 1.3 MODE S DEVELOPMENT

Mode S has been established by ICAO as the standard for SSR surveillance due to those performance and   functional   limitations   of the present   system   which   are   becoming increasingly significant.    Whilst the initial implementation emphasis is on surveillance, Mode S also establishes the potential of SSR as an air/ground datalink.


IFATCA Policy is:

The use of “Conspicuity Codes” of a Mode S identified aircraft within the Mode S area must ensure that the safe operations of all other non-mode S units in that airspace e.g. military operations are not compromised.


See: Resolution B3 – WP 91 – Bali 2013

See also: WP 91 – Geneva 2001


IFATCA Policy is:

The controller HMI shall clearly distinguish correlated aircraft and aircraft only transmitting aircraft ID*

*ID is the callsign of the flight as filed in the ICAO flight plan e.g. AZA611


See: WP 85 – Cancun 2002

IFATCA Policy is:

ATC systems must validate the Flight ID transmitted by an aircraft’s Mode S transponder and indicate to the controller any discrepancy with the ICAO aircraft identification in the flight plan.


See: Resolution B1 – WP 83 –   2010

IFATCA Policy is:

Any broadcast of incorrect ATM data should be corrected or if unable then: Switched off, or Marked as invalid.


See: Resolution B2 – WP 83 – Punta Cana 2010

IFATCA Policy is:

ATC surveillance systems must be able to process all data, regardless of the volume or type, necessary to provide ATC Services safely.


See: Resolution B4 – WP 90 – Kathmandu 2012

IFATCA Policy is:

The IFATCA Executive Board brings the issue of lack of clear procedures to regulate the operational use of down-linked airborne data from Mode-S to the attention of ICAO.


See: Resolution B3 – WP 91 – Bali 2013

 

Last Update: September 29, 2020  

November 3, 2019   150   Jean-Francois Lepage    AAS    

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